INTRODUCTION
As Mankiw (2003) points out in a recent survey of monetary economics, while traditional approaches to monetary policy had relied upon transmission to lower inflation through output (and employment) depression through the Phillips curve, this tradeoff seems to have been overcome in advanced economies through labour market reform which have allowed low inflation and low inflation to co-exist. 1 Modern scholars now reach a similar conclusion through a different route -that of independent and unpredictable monetary shocks. In a sense, the modern approach to monetary economics in emerging market economies is similar, although the shocks in question are those of international financial markets on the open developing economy: the exchange rate is thus far more important than textbook monetary theory 2 would allow.
Moreover, the Phillips curve had never been a convincing model of inflation in developing economies due to the extent of disguised unemployment. None the less, the Fund strongly holds the view 3 that central bank monetary discretion is inherently inflationary 4 , and thus makes binding monetary rules a condition for official financial assistance to emerging market governments.
The 'new monetary policy' (NMP) is understood to include: a numerical and official inflation target; monetary policy exercised through interest rates; an independent central bank; and no other objectives of monetary policy (Arestis and Sawyer, 2003) .
The monetary policy rule that generates interest rate responses to inflationary shocks replaces, in effect, the traditional LM curve; while the inter-temporal adjustment of expenditure by representative agents replaces the traditional IS curve. A key feature of the NMP is the reliance on central bank credibility to elicit the required private sector response to official policy. The critique suggests that a nominal anchor will not stabilise output due to the asymmetric effects of interest rates (which act on asset stocks rather than expenditure flows) and that an active fiscal policy should be combined with an active monetary policy, rather than relying upon a single rulebound instrument. Further, transparency may not have the strong effect on expectations that the NMP assumes it does, while the cost-side of inflation is ignored.
Above all, the 'credit channel' for monetary transmission should be explicitly considered in any monetary policy model. This paper extends and modifies this critique with reference to stabilisation policy in small open economies in general and emerging markets in particular. In Section 2, I
set out IMF 'basic monetary programming framework' -still applied to the lowincome developing economies without capital markets -which uses government borrowing and the exchange rate as policy instruments in order to achieve inflation and balance of payments targets. This is done following IMF (1987) , which then provides the underlying framework I use in the rest of this paper. I then adapt this standard model in order to include short-term capital flows and the floating exchange rate arising from financial liberalisation. In this way, the macroeconomic consequences of the current IMF focus on inflation targeting and the use of a single monetary policy instrument (the interest rate, combined with rigid fiscal and reserve 'rules') in emerging market economies can be demonstrated.
I then encompass the structuralist critique -particularly from Latin America -of the negative effect of inflation targeting on capacity utilisation and trade competitiveness in general, and the need for counter-cyclical monetary policy in response to external shocks in particular in Section 3. An alternative 'structuralist' model can be constructed in this way within a similar macroeconomic framework in order to permit a rigorous comparison with IMF inflation targeting. In this way I show that a macroeconomic stabilisation policy based on real exchange rate targeting, bank credit regulation and an active fiscal stance is more effective in supporting growth and investment than either of the IMF models. Section 4 concludes by suggesting that the emerging market critique of inflation targeting is very different to that for industrialised economies, principally because the balance of payments replaces the NAIRU as the principal macroeconomic constraint.
THE TWO IMF MODELS OF MONETARY POLICY, MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND IN FLATION TARGETING

Inflation targeting in the canonical IMF model
The canonical IMF monetary model, derived from an explicitly Keynesian 'adsorption approach' pioneered by Polack (1957) 5 and closely related to the 'monetary approach to the balance of payments', has the following form (IMF 1987 
Aggregate nominal income (Y) depends on the level of domestic prices (P) and real output (Q); while the resulting 'peso value' of the current account balance in dollars (B) depends on the nominal exchange rate (E)
In the 'adsorption approach' it is assumed that output (Q) is given in the short run; so that for a given target level of prices (P), the current account (im)balance (B) is controlled either by changing the level of nominal adsorption through one of the aggregate expenditure categories (e.g. government expenditure cuts) or by varying them all proportionately in real terms through an alteration in the exchange rate (e.g. devaluation). Note that the effect of devaluation is through the income effect on aggregate demand, not through relative prices as such. 
for the balance of payments on current and capital accounts
and the domestic monetary balance
The behavioural equations (equalities) are as follows. The private sector demand for money (i.e. for deposits in the banking system) is
and the private sector demand for credit from the banking system is
Finally import demand (in local prices) is given by
We have seven equations and seven variables to solve for (the five endogenous variables and the two targets) so that Walras' Law is satisfied; we also have two targets and two instruments, so Tinbergen's Principle is also satisfied. The model is thus both consistent and complete. give inflation as a function of the reserve target and the two policy instruments
Solving these two equations simultaneously yields the values for the targets (?R and 
This model can thus be seen as an early form of the IMF inflation targeting (IT)
model, but with the PSBR (?D) as the key policy instrument to achieve this aim.
The transmission mechanism is apparently simple and clear from [10] : clearly a lower PSBR as a share of GDP, or higher exports (or foreign borrowing) will all reduce inflation. However, there are two dimensions that are rather more curious. On the one hand, the exchange rate (E) is set to achieve the balance of payments target, but the higher its level (i.e. the more depreciated) then the less inflation there is. In other words, there is no pass-through -basically because inflation is based on monetary imbalance rather than cost structures. None the less, an increase in the import coefficient (m) through trade liberalisation will raise inflation in this model. On the other hand, and change in the money demand coefficent (v) through expectationsspecifically incipient hyperinflation leading to a sharp rise in the velocity of
However, the following characteristics of the model should also be noted:
7 See also Dornbusch and Helmers (1988) . 8 See FitzGerald (1993, chapter 4) for further discussion.
i. There is the strong implicit assumption that the money supply is endogenous (i.e. bank deposits depend on nominal income) in a Keynesian manner;
ii. Output is fixed in the short run and not affected by the fiscal stance; altho ugh if price stability and excess capacity is assumed, output could become a target variable in the IMF model (Khan et al 1990) 9 ;
iii.
There is strong and explicit assumption that all private demand for bank loans is to be satisfied, thus avoiding 'crowding out' by government borrowing; this can be interpreted as an implicit recognition that bank credit does affect output level, and that this should thus be kept at the capacity level.
iv.
There is no role for the interest rate in this model, as is taken to be fixed by the central bank at below the market-clearing rate (the familiar 'financial repression' notion inspired by McKinnon) -and thus again there is an implicit credit-rationing process taking place;
v. And last, but not least, the fact that the exchange rate is a policy instrument implies not only that it is actively administered by the central bank but also that it is supported by capital account controls.
IMF inflation targeting with a floating exchange rate
In the 1990s, of course, the IMF position on exchange rates changed significantly, moving towards an insistence on floating rates. This was accompanied by support for domestic financial liberalisation and the suspension of capital controls in order to stimulate foreign portfolio investment. This meant on the one hand, that the interest rate would become an active policy instrument; and on the other, that the exchange rate would no longer be available as an instrument. The exchange rate would find its own level on a foreign exchange market without cent ral bank intervention.
The exposure of the economy to national and international capital markets also meant that the IMF moved towards a position that the budget deficit should not act as a policy instrument: either because it gave the wrong signals to markets, or because politicians could not be trusted with macroeconomic management. The current position is thus that strict budget balances should be maintained.
In consequence, in terms of the Tinbergen criterion, the policy targets are reduced to one (inflation) and the policy instruments to one (the interest rate 
for the balance of payments
The behavioural equations can be modified to include the effect of the interest rate (i) as follows. The private sector demand for money (i.e. for deposits in the banking system) is now
Finally import demand (in local prices) is given as before by
[17]
But now external liabilities (F) are not exogenous, but affected by the interest rate and the change in exchange rates (which we assume to proxy for expectations), so that we can write (risk premium and world interest rates can be seen as reflected in ?)
Two new macroeconomic 'rules' are now added which reflect the increasingly constrained nature of IMF policy constraints on developing country governments in the name of 'sound fundamentals'. First, in pursuance of lo ng-run budgetary stability 10 , net borrowing must be limited to a fixed proportion (?) of GDP, such that
In other words, there is no independent fiscal policy as a macroeconomic instrument any more. And second, that the central bank does not intervene in the foreign exchange market, leaving the exchange rate (E) to act as an automatic balance.
Instead, the central bank maintains a reserve level fixed as a certain proportion of imports. 11 We can represent this rule by
With nine variables (eight endogenous and one target) and nine equations, Walras'
Law is satisfied; while with one target (inflation) and one policy instrument (the interest rate) the Tinbergen criterion is met. The model is thus both consistent and complete. into [14] in order to obtain the domestic monetary balance in terms of the same three
Because of the 'reserves rule' [20], rearranging [22] and then dividing through by P in fact yields an expression for the rate of inflation in terms of the interest rate (i) alone
This result encapsulates the Fund's current inflation-targeting regime for emerging market economies. It is combined with binding rules for the PSBR and for the level of foreign reserves to be maintained irrespective of the point in the business cycle -or, more importantly to emerging markets -of the conditions on international financial markets. With the abandonment of capital controls and managed exchange rates, the floating exchange rate is supposed to take care of external adjustment automatically.
The transmission mechanism is clearly modified with respect to the first 'canonical' model. The demand and supply of bank deposits is intermediated by the interest rate, which thus serves to moderate domestic monetary imbalances, but it also serves to modify capital inflows and thus achieve the desired balance of payments position. The fiscal deficit is constrained by the inter-temporal budget solvency condition (?) so that an increased interest rate reduces inflation in [23] by stimulating bank deposits and reducing the demand for credit. Thus the shortcoming of the first Fund model of not including interest rates is apparently overcome; but the assumption of fixed output (or more precisely that the interest rate has no effect on output) now seems even more untenable 12 -particularly because at least in the first model the policy setup ensured that all the credit requirements of the private sector (i.e. producers) were met.
Note, moreover, that an increase in the import coefficient (m) aris ing from trade liberalisation will also increase inflation and require even higher interest rates in order to restore the economy to its monetary target. The model also implies that financial liberalisation itself will have the effect of increasing inflationary pressures and thus increasing the interest rate required to meet a specific inflation target: specifically, new financial instruments and increased competition between intermediaries will tend to both increase the velocity of circulation of money (i.e. reduce v) and increase the income elasticity of demand for credit (i.e. raise f ).
However, the most serious shortcoming of this approach is not clear from [23] itself.
From [21] it is evident that the exchange rate must then adjust (i.e. 'float') in response to the target inflation rate (p*) and the corresponding interest rate (i*), with increased interest rates leading to an appreciation (i.e. reduction) of E. 
In other words, lower inflation targets (p*) and thus higher interest rates (i*) not only unambiguously lead to appreciation of the real exchange rate (e) but also that this effect is 'explosive'. 13 There will thus be a built-in bias towards over-valuation of the exchange rate (and loss of export competitiveness and thus less growth) from inflation targeting. Further, and even more seriously, external capital market shocks (i.e sharp 12 This is a key element of Stiglitz' critique of Fund programmes which were a condition for international liquidity provision in the Asian crisis of 1997 -see Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, chapter 13 shock (e.g. from contagion), except that the impact on domestic credit supply is even stronger on the downswing.
Moreoever, Eichengreen (2003) points out, in practice balance of payments shocks (whether from trade or capital flows) will cause inflation through devaluation but an interest-rate response by the central bank will be ineffective because the imported inflationary effects are very large in comparison to the required demand reduction and the output gap consequences would be far too serious if the real interest rate were really raised sufficiently.
In sum, inflation targeting in emerging economies -even if domestic output were unaffected -is still highly undesirable because it exposes the macreoconomy to exogenous capital account shocks with no feasible means of countering them. This, rather than the employment effect identified in the critique of IT for G7 economies, is the major weakness of the IMF approach even within its own assumptions about macroeconomic behaviour. However, these assumptions themselves -particularly about output determination, fiscal response and central banking -are also unrealistic, as we shall see in the next section.
AN ALTERNATIVE STUCTURALIST (OR 'PERIPHERAL KEYNESIAN') APPROACH
The structuralist critique
The central issue in monetary policy for emerging markets in not inflation as such (particularly at the low levels regarded as problematic in industrialised countries) but rather "managing the pro-cyclical effects of externally generated boom-bust cycles" (Ocampo, 2000:1) . These external shocks are essentially asymmetric, in the sense that emerging markets are 'cycle takers' rather than 'cycle makers' 16 and they are exacerbated by inherited debt positions. Exchange rates are subject to two conflicting demands: first, the stability of trade, prices and capital flows; and second, the flexibility required in order to adjust current and capital accounts to exogenous changes. Hard pegs serve to anchor the price level but lead to real exchange rate problems and eventually speculative crises. Floating rates lead to instability in domestic prices and expenditure that undermines investment and growth. Moreover, "given the reduced effectiveness of some traditional policy instruments -particularly monetary policy -the exchange rate plays an essential role in helping adsorb such shocks" (Ocampo op. cit. p. 16 ).
This ineffectiveness of monetary policy is the result of uncovered interest parity once capital controls are removed and short term capital can move freely. 17 In the upswing of a cycle (the 'boom') the interest rate declines and the exchange rate appreciates, but any attempt to counter the boom attracts still more funds and the exchange rate appreciates still further. In the downswing ('bust') markets push for devaluation but this forces up interest rates and exacerbates production declines. Underlying this behaviour are a number of structural factors, including: (a) purchasing power parity does not obtain and thus there is no 'natural' exchange rate for market expectations to converge upon; (b) the thin and narrow local financial markets reduce the advantages of a free float by failing to provide a buffer for domestic firms; and (c) the dependence of public finances on foreign borrowing makes the fiscal stance 16 Just as they are price-takers rather than price-makers in international trade. 17 That is, without intervention, the domestic interest rate will be the sum of the world interest rate plus expected devaluation plus the risk premium (?)
automatically pro-cyclical. Thus "generally speaking, authorities have found it difficult to undertake anti-cyclical monetary policies under all [exchange rate] regimes. Broadly speaking, interest rate movements follow the external cycle in all countries. ... True episodes of 'monetary autonomy' have been rare, but have been more frequent in Colombia and Chile, the two countries that have used more actively capital account regulation as a complement to exchange rate policy" (op. cit. p. 19).
In sum, the structuralist critique is double: on the one hand, that the macro-economy works in a different way from that which the Fund supposes -the role of credit rationing and capacity utilisation being crucial; and on the other hand that multiple policy targets are not only institutionally feasible but socially necessary -rather than relying upon the central bank targeting inflation through the interest rate.
An alternative model for monetary programming
We set up the model in a similar formal framework to the two Fund models discussed above, except that: on the one hand we allow for output (Q) to be below capacity (K), and that this can be adjusted by means of the level of credit to the private sector -in effect this can be seen as reflecting direct intervention via (say) reserve requirements in the traditional manner, or else prudential controls over bank lending in view of maturity or currency mismatch 18 ; and on the other, we return to multiple targets and thus policy instruments, in recognition of the multidimensiona l nature of exogenous shocks and the need to reduce the fluctuations in the real exchange rate that undermine investment in the export sector on the other.
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Exogenous variables: exports (X), production capacity (K ), initial price level
18 See FitzGerald (1999). 19 For a rigorous case in support of REER targeting in order to limit volatility, see Branson (2001) . Joshi (2003) suggests that this must be supported by capital controls, and that the volatility reduction justifies their inevitable efficiency costs. Definitions (identities) are as follows. For nominal income we have, as before
while inflation is
and the real exchange rate is
For the balance of payments on current and capital accounts we have as before
The behavioural equations have similar forms to previously, but rather different meanings. The private sector demand for money (i.e. for deposits in the banking system) is as before
but the private sector demand for credit from the banking system in [16] is now inverted to provide an expression for the effect of controlled bank lending on real output within the limit of capacity (K), this being credit rationing at the macroeconomic level
Import demand (in local prices) is given as before by
[32]
And external liabilities (F) -remembering that risk premium and world interest rates (reflected in ?) can shift suddenly and this is a frequent and major source of external shocks -are given as before by
However, the macroeconomic 'rules' are now rather different. First, the long-run importance of debt solvency is maintained; but this now relates to the 'structural' budget deficit 22 , while the deficit in any one year can vary so long as the overall balance is maintained in the long run. 23 Moreover, the policy instrument itself is the primary deficit (Z) so as to take into account the major effect of interest rates (i) on debt service in emerging economies 24 :
In other words, there is an independent fiscal policy as a short-run macroeconomic instrument again, although in the long run the debt solvency rule is maintained.
Second, while the central bank does not intervene directly in the foreign exchange market, it does use the interest rate (i.e. intervention in the bond market) to target the real exchange rate. It maintains a reserve level adapted to the short-term external debt position (F) as a form of insurance against external shock -a process usually known as 'sterilisation'. This means that if capital flows out, reserves can be run down with an expansionary effect on the economy through import provision as another form of counter-cyclical policy. 25 We can represent this new rule by
Walras' Law is satisfied because we have eleven equations and eleven variables (eight endogenous and three targets); while Tinbergen's criterion is met by the three targets (p, e and Q) and the three instruments (Z, H, and i).
Our three reduced form equations are now as follows. The new addition is of course the credit supply function [31] , which for notational simplicity we express in terms of real credit to the private sector (
23 In effect we are saying that over the whole cycle the original rule must hold, but not within it, as the key aspect of counter-cyclical fiscal policy -see Ocampo (2000) . Bacha (1990) , which also allows for the effect of the exchange rate on the PSBR through the burden of external debt service -an aspect ignored here but which could easily be included. 25 It is notorious that the East Asian economies have been successful in building up large reserves since the 1987 crisis , by running large current account surpluses and paying off the 'bail out' loans rapidly; unlike Latin America which remains with low reserves and high short-term indebtedness.
Note that it is not suggested that this is a growth mechanism as such (which depends on the accumulation of physical and human capital) but rather a means of adjusting output within capacity as a counter-cyclical stabilisation mechanism. 
Assuming that the target of stabilising the real exchange rate is in fact achieved (and 
We can assume that at equilibrium the real exchange rate is stable ( 0 
The transmission mechanism in this model is quite different from those in the Fund model:
i. First, and most strikingly, higher interest rates actually increase inflation due to the resulting increase in the PSBR and the reduction in output as well as the impact on capital flows 26 ;
ii. Second, given that credit management (H) has already been used to set output (Q) and the interest rate to ensure a competitive real exchange rate (e); so the primary budget deficit (Z) is used for inflation control;
iii. Third, there is no reason to believe that a primary budget balance (i.e. Z = 0) is compatible with low (or even zero) inflation -rather the appropriate balance depends upon the other factors in [38] such as the output and real exchange rate targets on the one hand and particular parameter valued on the other.
In sum, monetary policy in the structuralist model integrates exchange rate management and capacity utilisation into the process of inflation control by using multiple policy instruments -in marked contrast to the Fund approach with a single target and a single instrument.
Conclusions
This or (iii) accumulated crises and incompetencies in the past which undermine credibility. This is not only a rather patronising attitude towards major regional states, but does not allow for substantive learning from past incidents on the part of central banks and finance ministries in emerging markets. One such lesson is that "to avoid credibility issues, and thus guarantee effectiveness, capital account regulation should be in place throughout the business cycle" (Ocampo 2000, p. 18 ).
